Is what Abiy Ahmed said about Eritrea in his Tigrinya interview true? Every claim, checked

What was said

On 19 October 2026 Ethiopia’s state broadcaster EBC published a 27-minute interview with Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed, conducted in Tigrinya A. He spoke about Eritrea for two and a half minutes, in answer to a question about Eritrea and the PFDJ, its ruling party; the opening montage replays parts of the same answer. He cited no source, document or study for anything he said about Eritrea.

We read EBC’s Amharic subtitles for the whole interview and checked every statement about Eritrea in it, his and the interviewer’s. The quotations are EBC’s subtitles in our translation; a native speaker’s check of the Tigrinya audio is pending.

1. “Eritrea’s cities … have become the size of villages”

The claim (20:00-20:52): before independence Eritrea’s cities were “flourishing and vibrant”; “today, however, they have become the size of villages”; “Massawa has been left empty; Assab too has become a city without people”. AFP rendered it as “Eritrean cities seem like ghost towns” B; EBC’s subtitle has no word for ghost.

The record. Ethiopia’s own 1984 census counted Asmara at 281,110, Keren at 26,339 and Assab at 32,457; Massawa had fewer than 20,000 C. Africapolis estimates Massawa at 33,840 and Keren at 78,840 in 2020; it puts Assab at 37,170, below its 1990 estimate but above the 1984 census count D. The UN puts Assab at 67,712 in 2025 F. Satellite measures show Asmara, Massawa and Assab all growing in built-up area since 1990 E.

The last years of Ethiopian rule were not “vibrant”. The Ethiopian air force bombed Massawa from 16 February to 10 June 1990, killing over 100 civilians, in what Africa Watch called a policy “intended to reduce Massawa to rubble” H. In besieged Asmara, government soldiers “killed many civilians and created famine conditions by requisitioning food”, Human Rights Watch reported I.

Assab’s port is idle. It lived on Ethiopia’s transit trade, which had almost stopped by March 1999 J, and in 2024 it had no commercial operation K. The town is not empty.

Our finding: Misleading. No estimate or satellite measure shows an Eritrean town shrunk to a village; Massawa is larger than under Ethiopian rule.

2. “More than 300 factories” while part of Ethiopia

The claim (20:16-20:34): “While Eritrea was part of Ethiopia it had more than 300 factories. At the time it was considered one of the most industrially developed in Africa.”

The record. The only “more than 300 factories” figure we found is for 1945, under British administration, seven years before federation with Ethiopia L. Under Ethiopian rule the official counts were 88 industries in 1962 and 165 in 1970 L. Eritrea did hold a large share of Ethiopia’s industry: about 35% of it in 1970, by UNIDO’s figures L. After 1974 Ethiopia’s military government nationalised 42 of Eritrea’s most important enterprises, and at the height of the war its plants ran at under 20% of capacity L.

Our finding: Misleading. Our full check has the detail.

3. Asmara “smaller than Arba Minch or Jijiga”

The claim (20:38-20:45): “Today, if you take Asmara, it has become a city smaller than Arba Minch or Jijiga.”

The record. On every dataset we found, Asmara is larger than Arba Minch F D. Only the UN’s 2025 estimates put Asmara (228,270) below Jijiga (422,225), and the UN rates its own Asmara figure “Low” plausibility F. The UN’s previous edition put Asmara at 962,985 in 2020 G, and Africapolis gives Asmara 482,160 against Jijiga’s 148,784 D. Eritrea has held no census since independence, so Asmara’s exact size is not known.

Our finding: Misleading.

4. “After independence the Eritrean people have lost everything they had”

The claim (20:56).

The record. Every health, schooling and infrastructure measure we found is better today than at independence.

• Life expectancy rose from 50.5 years in 1991 to 68.9 in 2024 M.
• Deaths of children under five fell from 146 per 1,000 live births in 1991 to 34 in 2024 N.
• Maternal deaths fell from 1,384 per 100,000 live births in 1991 to 291 in 2023 O.
• Vaccination of children with three doses of DTP rose from 32% in 1993 to 95% in 2024 P.
• Gross primary enrolment was 77% in 1993 and 90% in 2022; secondary enrolment was 24% and 44% Q.
• Access to electricity rose from 23% of the population in 1995 to 55% in 2024 R.

The UN’s child mortality group listed Eritrea among the low-income countries that cut child deaths by two thirds and “achieved the MDG 4 target” S. The WHO placed it among the African countries projected to have cut malaria incidence by more than 75% between 2000 and 2015 T. On life expectancy, child deaths and vaccination, Eritrea today is ahead of Ethiopia M N P.

Our finding: False.

5. The PFDJ “abandoning development and the building of institutions”

The claim (21:14), and the interviewer’s “abandoning development work” (19:14).

The record. The African Development Bank wrote in 2025 that Eritrea “has constructed or rehabilitated over 880 dams, most in rural and underserved areas” U. The Bisha mine, then 40% owned by the state, began commercial production in 2011 W, and the US Geological Survey estimated that about 110,000 tonnes of zinc and 3,700 kg of gold were mined in 2018 V. The 30 MW Dekemhare solar plant was 96% complete and being commissioned in April 2026 X.

On institutions, the UN’s own Resident Coordinator in Eritrea wrote in May 2026 of “what has been built since 1991: national institutions, schools, clinics, roads, water systems” Y.

Our finding: False.

6. “Exile and mistreatment” and Ethiopia as a “refuge”

The claims. Abiy (21:02): “today exile and mistreatment have become [the Eritrean people’s] defining mark”. The interviewer (19:42-19:56): “thousands of young people live sheltered in our country”, “the country that has become a refuge for many Eritreans”.

The record. Ethiopia does host more Eritrean refugees and asylum seekers than any other country: 169,635 at the end of 2025, UNHCR says Z. The mistreatment they meet there is the Ethiopian government’s own. In January 2020, Human Rights Watch reported, it unofficially stopped granting Eritrean asylum seekers refugee status as a group A1; according to UN experts, its refugee agency stopped registering new arrivals in March 2020 B1. In July 2023 UN human rights experts condemned its “summary expulsion of hundreds of Eritreans” at the end of June, cited reports of continued arrests and detention of Eritreans without charge, and said: “It also appears that the authorities are specifically targeting Eritreans” B1 C1.

Exile and mistreatment mark Abiy’s own country in larger numbers. At the end of 2025 Ethiopia had 2,378,000 people displaced inside its borders and 313,000 refugees and asylum seekers abroad Z. Ethiopians made 96% of the 446,194 journeys IOM tracked in 2024 on the Eastern Route to Yemen and Saudi Arabia D1, where Saudi border guards killed “at least hundreds” of Ethiopian migrants in 2022 and 2023, Human Rights Watch found E1.

Our finding: “defining mark” is a characterisation, not a fact we can test. The “refuge” is the country whose government UN experts condemned for expelling Eritreans.

7. “A tool of Ethiopia’s enemies”

The claim (21:14-22:21): the PFDJ “has become a tool of Ethiopia’s enemies”; “choosing to be the plaything of enemies does not pay”. AFP rendered it “a base for Ethiopia’s enemies” B and Anadolu “a host of enemies” F1; neither word is in EBC’s subtitles.

The record. Every specific accusation we found from 2025 and 2026 that Eritrea arms or directs groups fighting Ethiopia comes from the Ethiopian government, its army or police, state media or a federally backed militia (reports of Eritrean troops in Tigray are in section 11): the federal police on an ammunition seizure in January 2026 G1, the army chief in September H1 and the state-affiliated Fana in October I1. None presented a document, a weapon trace or an independent finding, and Eritrea denies the charges G1 H1. The UN lifted all its sanctions on Eritrea in November 2018 J1, and we found no UN or other independent investigation of the charge since.

Our finding: Unsupported.

8. “Beyond handing over bullets”

The claim (21:27-21:36): “even those who say ‘take heart’ cannot solve Eritrea’s problem beyond handing over bullets”. He named no one.

The record. Foreign armed drones are documented in Ethiopia. From satellite imagery, the Dutch group PAX identified Chinese Wing Loong drones at Ethiopia’s Harar Meda air base in 2021, and said imagery from December 2021 “confirms the presence” of Turkish Bayraktar TB2s there L1 M1. Defense News reported in September 2026 that flight records “suggest a link” between a sanctioned Russian airline and more than 100 missions flown for the UAE government since mid-2025, with Harar Meda “a recurring destination” K1.

Since the UN lifted its arms embargo on Eritrea in November 2018 J1, we found no record of a foreign arms delivery to Eritrea except Ethiopia’s own. CNN found that in November 2020 Ethiopian Airlines flew guns and ammunition from Addis Ababa to Asmara and Massawa, billed to Ethiopia’s Ministry of Defence; the airline denied it N1. The 2024 Asmara summit of Eritrea, Egypt and Somalia pledged to strengthen Somalia’s army; its statement says nothing about arms for Eritrea O1. The Amhara Media Corporation reported on 25 October that Ethiopia’s army chief had told a Defence Forces Day event the army had seized weapons sent through Massawa; its report gives no inventory, photographs or dates P1.

Our finding: Unsupported.

9. “As seen over the past 35 years, only good neighbourliness and friendship pay off”

The claim (21:59-22:06).

The record of Ethiopia as a neighbour. In 2000 Ethiopia signed the Algiers Agreement, which made the Boundary Commission’s ruling “final and binding” Q1. When the ruling placed Badme in Eritrea, Ethiopia announced in 2003 that it would not allow demarcation at Badme and Irob, and its prime minister called the decisions “totally illegal, unjust and irresponsible” R1. In 2005 the Security Council demanded that Ethiopia “accept fully and without further delay” the ruling S1; Ethiopia’s ruling coalition announced full acceptance only in June 2018 T1.

The Claims Commission set up by the same agreement held Ethiopia liable for arbitrarily stripping dual nationals of their Ethiopian nationality and for permitting the forcible expulsion of rural people from near the border, among other violations U1. In March 2012 Ethiopia’s government said its soldiers had attacked three locations 14 to 18 km inside Eritrea V1. In January 2010 the IGAD council of ministers, chaired by Ethiopia’s foreign minister, urged the UN to sanction Eritrean leaders “as a matter of urgency” W1; the Security Council lifted all sanctions in 2018, recognising that its monitors had found no conclusive evidence that Eritrea supported Al-Shabaab J1.

In January 2024 Ethiopia signed a memorandum with Somaliland giving it a military base and sea access, which Mogadishu condemned as an “aggression” and a “blatant assault” on its sovereignty X1. On 9 October 2026 Ethiopia told the Security Council it was “taking measures” in “self-defence” against Eritrea Z1, and by 13 October, Reuters reported, its troops had entered Zalambessa, on the border Y1.

Our finding: sound advice. Ethiopia’s acceptance of the boundary ruling in 2018 followed it; much of the rest of its record does not.

10. “Turning a deaf ear to our call … the danger will be very, very, very, very grave”

The claim (22:25-22:33). Abiy did not say what “our call” is; just before, he urged “good neighbourliness” and being a “development partner”.

The record. Ethiopia’s public calls to Eritrea include a call to “cease its aggression and withdraw its forces”, made in its 9 October letter to the Security Council Z1, a charge we found unsupported (section 11). Abiy’s own calls are about the sea. In a televised speech on 13 October 2023 he listed Adulis, Massawa and Assab among Ethiopia’s options for a sea outlet and raised federation or confederation with Eritrea, adding that Eritreans could refuse, that it was their right, and that it would not happen by force A2. In the same speech he called Ethiopia “a nation whose existence is tied to the Red Sea”, said “150 million people can’t live in a geographic prison”, and warned: “If there is no justice, it’s only a matter of time before entering into conflict” B2. In September 2025 he said the Red Sea “was in our hands 30 years ago” and that the “mistake” would “be corrected tomorrow” C2. On 5 October 2026 he told parliament: “Based on the principle of give and take, we will work diligently to ensure that Ethiopia has an outlet to the sea” D2.

The law says three things. The UN Charter bans “the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity” of any state E2. The African Union’s founding act binds members to “respect of borders existing on achievement of independence” F2. The Law of the Sea gives land-locked states transit only on terms agreed with transit states, which keep “full sovereignty over their territory” G2; Ethiopia has never ratified it and Eritrea is not a party H2.

Our finding: a warning, not a fact. If it is a threat of force, the UN Charter prohibits it.

11. The interviewer: Eritrea “entered our territory” with the TPLF

The claim (19:14-19:32): the Eritrean government is “engaged in disturbing the peace of its neighbours, especially our country”, and “recently, collaborating with the TPLF”, it “entered our territory”.

The record. We have checked this charge many times since early October. Ethiopia told the UN that an Eritrean “all-out invasion” was “a matter of public record”; the record contains witness accounts, a conflict monitor’s report and an Eritrean denial, but no independent confirmation (Unsupported). Ethiopia’s consul in Bahrain placed Eritrean troops at Badme on “Ethiopian soil”; Badme is in Eritrea (False). Nothing we read documents joint operations with the TPLF. Eritrea says its forces remain “stationed entirely within the internationally recognized borders” I2. The interviewer gave no example of the “disturbing the peace” charge; the specific accusations we found are in section 7.

Our finding: Unsupported, on the charge that Eritrea entered Ethiopian territory with the TPLF.

Our verdict

Misleading. Abiy’s central claims, that Eritreans “lost everything” after independence and that the PFDJ abandoned development, are false on every health, schooling and infrastructure measure we found. His charges that the PFDJ is “a tool of Ethiopia’s enemies” and is handed “bullets” rest on no published evidence beyond Ethiopian officials’ statements; the foreign armed drones on record are in Ethiopia. His own government’s record undercuts his lines on neighbourliness and refuge. Where his lines touch the record, they bend it: Eritrea did hold a large share of Ethiopia’s industry, but not 300 factories under Ethiopian rule; Assab’s port is idle, but the town is not empty; and only one UN estimate, which the UN itself rates of “Low” plausibility, puts Asmara below Jijiga.